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SHOULD THE SENATE PASS ON THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC VIEWS OF NOMINEES TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES*

T

HE rejection 1 by the United States Senate of the Presidential nomination of John Johnson Parker of North
Carolina as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States focused the attention of the American
public on the question of the respective roles of the President and the Senate in the appointment of judges to our
highest bench.
The particular charges against Mr. Parker were four in
number: (1) that he lacked ability and training, (2) that
as a judge of a lower federal court he had rendered a decision that was hostile to union labor, (3) that as a candidate
for public office in North Carolina he had made a statement
on the stump that the Negro in his present status was unfit
for high political office, and (4) that the appointment was
purely a political one-a "master political stroke" to keep
alive the Republican organization in North Carolina. It
shall not be our purpose to discuss the merits of these particular charges. Rather we shall address our remarks to
the more fundamental question as to the policy of the United
States Senate in rejecting Presidential nominations to the
Supreme Court because of the social and economic views of
the aspirants.
By way of introduction, we shall present first the historical explanation for the American system of federal judicial appointments. The Constitution of the United States
provides 2 that "He (the President) shall nominate, and by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint
* * * the Judges of the Supreme Court." Three considera-

tions are responsible for the above provision:

3

First, at the

* This is an address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Law
Teachers Association at the Stevens Hotel, Chicago, Dec. 29, 1930.
1 The Senate rejected Mr. Parker on May 7, 1930, after a debate of more
than a week's duration. See 72 Cong. Rec. 6101. Also see Cong. Rec. for
debates of Apr. 28, May 2, 5, 7, 1930.
'Art. II, Sec. 2, Clause 2.
'See Salmon, Lucy P. The Appointing Power of the President. 1 PAPERS
OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL AssociATioN

5, p. 9 (N. Y. 1886).
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time of the adoption of our Constitution, in England, the
appointing power was in the executive. The framers of our
Constitution, from experience, feared the Executive, and they
were in no mood to encourage the growth of executive power;
so they provided that the legislature should share in the
appointing power. Secondly, under the Articles of Confederation the appointing power was in Congress. Experience
had shown the "impropriety of such appointments by numerous bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were
the necessary consequences."1 4 So after the "critical period"
sole legislative appointment was out of the question.
Thirdly, the appointing systems in the states prior to the
Constitution were not satisfactory. George Mason in the
Constitutional Convention, inveighed against "the shameful
partiality of the legislature of Virginia to its own members." 1 Alexander Hamilton, in discussing the weakness of
the system in New York where the appointing power was
vested in a governor and a Council of Appointment, declared
that scandalous appointments to important offices had been
made. "Some cases indeed have been so flagrant that ALL
parties have agreed to the impropriety of the thing." 6
Three general plans were presented to the Constitutional Convention. The Virginia Plan, presented by Edmund
Randolph, contained no express provision relating to the
appointing power, but it did empower the President "to
enjoy the executive rights vested in Congress by the Articles
of Confederation." 7 This would have given the President
the appointing power, but since the executive was elected by
Congress, the legislative body would have had considerable
indirect control.
The New Jersey Plan,' presented by William Patterson,
provided for a plural executive with appointing power, but
the executive was to be elected by Congress, and here again
the legislative body would have had indirect control.
' 1 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 119 (New
Haven 1910).
'5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES (Washington 1845) pp. 230-232.
62 FEDERALIST, 55 (Universal Classic Library Edition).
1'5 ELLIOT, op. cit. note 5, at 127-128.
8
Ibid. at 191-192.
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The Alexander Hamilton Plan 9 provided for a President with life tenure to be chosen by presidential electors.
The President was to have the appointment of the heads of
departments of finance, war and foreign affairs, and the
nomination of all other officers subject to the approval or
disapproval of the Senate. It will be noted that the Constitutional Convention in its attempt to avoid the weaknesses of earlier systems of appointment, leaned heavily on
the Hamilton plan. So much for the historical background.
The next point by way of introduction is to determine
the extent to which the Senate has utilized directly its power
of "advice and consent" in rejecting presidential nominations to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is
impossible to determine to what extent Senators have influenced the nomination of candidates by the President.
During our history, although the Supreme Court has varied
in size, the total number of appointments to date is seventyeight. The senate has rejected eight nominees. 10 They are
John Rutledge, Dec. 15, 1795; Alexander Wolcott, Feb. 13,
1811; John C. Spencer, Jan. 13, 1844; George W. Woodward, Jan. 22, 1846; Ebeneazer R. Hoar, Feb. 3, 1870; William H. Hornblower, Feb. 16, 1894; Wheeler H. Peckham,
Feb. 16, 1894, and John Johnson Parker, May 7, 1930. It
should be noted that the first rejection is the only one relating to the-Chief Justiceship, 1" and that the party involved,
John Rutledge, had formerly held an Associate Justiceship.
The fight in the Senate over the Parker nomination was
not limited to the narrow question of the intellectual ability
and moral qualifications of the nominee. The clash between
Senators Fess and Borah raised a much more fundamental
problem, to which we shall direct our discussion. Senator
' Ibid. p. 206.
'" It is believed that this list is complete.
The information has been taken
from the official Executive Journals of the Senate until 1901 and after 1901
from the Congressional Record. The early indices were inadequate. See
2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORY, Appendix
pp. 757, 763. Also a Partial List of Executive Nominations rejected by the
Senate, Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service Pamphlet JK
583.
"26 votes were recorded against the appointment of Charles Evans Hughes
as Chief Justice. Such leaders as Webster, Clay and Calhoun were opposed
to Taney's appointment as Chief Justice.
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Fess,'2 the chief defender of Parker, intimated that "Parker
is an incident. The Supreme Court is the issue." He declared that "an effort was being made to break down the
independence of the Supreme Court by attacking nominees
who do not fit in with the particular views of those who
criticise." Senator Borah,"3 on the other hand, frankly admitted that "The Supreme Court judges pass upon what
we do. Therefore it is exceedingly important that we pass
upon them. * * * We declare a national policy, they reject
it. I feel that I am well justified in inquiring of men on
their way to the Supreme Court something of their views
on those questions."
The Senatorial debate thus raised the problem of the
role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system.
Is the Supreme Court often a third legislative department?
Does Senatorial investigation of every possible qualification
of a nominee undermine the independence of the judiciary?
Is it sound public policy for the Senate to pass upon the
social and economic views of the nominee?
In order to discuss intelligently the problem raised by
the Parker case, two preliminary considerations should be
disposed of. Firstly, we should not be misled by the professions of the court that "It is not their function to hold
Congressional acts invalid simply because they are passed
to carry out economic views which the court believes to be
unwise or unsound." 14 That sentiment has been expressed
innumerable times by our highest court since John Marshall
inaugurated the "awful" power of judicial review. The
crux of the problem is what the court does, not what it says
it does. Secondly, let it be understood that there is no question as to any lack of constitutional POWER in the Senate
to examine the nominee from every possible point of view.
As far as the particular nominee is concerned, the Senatorial power of "consent" is as broad as the Presidential
power of nomination. The only question is one of POLICY.
"Cong. Rec. Apr. 29, 1930.
" Cong. Rec. Apr. 29, 1930, p. 8220; also May 6, 1930, p. 8722.
" Taft, C. J. dissenting in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525,
See majority decision in Northern Securities
562; 43 Sup. Ct. 30 (1922).
See 1 WnLCo. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436 (1903).
LOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 32.
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We cannot go far in the field of American constitutional
law without encountering two widely divergent schools of
thought. At the one extreme, we find a doctrinaireconceptualism that visualizes the fundamental law as a body of
definite, eternal and immutable principles, that worships it
as "a Temple of Liberty and Justice" and that attributes
to the founding fathers the supreme achievement of crystallizing in the "Ark of the Covenant" the political wisdom of
the ages. This position assumes that the authors of the
Constitution were omniscient and that they anticipated each
and every situation that might possibly arise. Obsessed by
the dogma of the "separation of powers," the adherents of
this view over-simplify the problem of government, and make
of the court a sort of judicial slot machine. To the members of this school legislation is for the legislature, for is
not the Constitution clear and complete, and is not the
court's only function to determine the law as it IS, not as
it OUGHT to be? To them, the Supreme Court is the holy
of holies, an independent tribunal, functioning in a vacuum
above and beyond the contemporary turmoils of party politics and the passing vagaries of temporary majorities.
At the other extreme are those that deny that it is possible to provide for any future contingency because each
and every situation contains an element of novelty and calls
for an unique treatment. The members of this school are so
completely under the spell of the idea that we are living in
a dynamic world that they deny the possibility of formulating any principles whatsoever, for words uttered yesterday could not have the same meaning today. To them a
written Constitution containing "parchment barriers" is a
futile thing. The evolving sense of right of the community
is the only source and sanction of law. All is flux and "with
every breath of the American people, there is born a new
Constitution." To them there is no distinction between interpretation and legislation. They have seized upon the idea
that the Supreme Court is legislating generally, and in criticising that tribunal they are attempting to judge it by
standards that are applicable only to a popular, representative, legislative body. This latter position should be viewed
as a protest against the canonization of the Constitution
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which has so long dominated our legal and political thought.
The protagonists of the dynamic approach, however, in their
eagerness to demolish the static conception, have overstated
their case. Perhaps somewhere between these two extremes
will be found a realistic way of viewing the role of the
Supreme Court as the ultimate umpire in our constitutional
system.
The writer, although not an adherent of the extreme
dynamic school, believes that it is sound policy for the Senate
to pass on the social and economic views of nominees to the
Supreme Court. As we see it, there is a fundamental difference in the very nature of the action of a court (1) in
interpreting a statutory or constitutional provision which
is vague and ambiguous from that of (2) attempting to
repeal or modify a concise and definite statutory or constitutional provision. The unwary who are unable to grasp
the distinction will characterize the court in both cases as
"legislating" or in both cases as "interpreting" as it suits
their interests. Actually, the court in the first case, is performing one of the primary and legitimate functions of the
judicial department; that of interpreting the law. In the
second case, the court is usurping power and is assuming
the role either of a legislative or a constitutive body.
As an illustration of the distinction, consider the Supreme Court's attitude toward two great anti-trust statutes,
the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act. In deciding in the
former'15 case that the Clayton Act did not exempt labor
unions from the operation of the Sherman Act, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Clayton Act in the only legitimate
way that it could interpret it.' 6 In the second case 1 the
court, by adopting the so-called "Rule of Reason," read into
the Sherman Act the word "unreasonable" and the Big
Business interests thus gained a victory, which through their
powerful Congressional lobby, they had been unable to secure
for a period of twenty-one years by means of an amendment
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172

.(1920).
" See article by author in WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY STUDIES (1924), "How
Far is the Theory of Trust Regulation Applicable to Labor Unions."
7 Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup.
Ct. 502 (1910).
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to the Sherman Anti-Trust law. The labor sympathizers,
failing to realize the distinction between interpretation and
legislation, vehemently criticised both decisions. As a matter of fact, the criticism of the latter was deserving, but
that of the former was wholly unwarranted. In the former
case, Congress, the only culprit, escaped the wrath of the
labor forces.
Three great jurists have commented on the general nature of the judicial function in so far as it relates to judicial
law making. Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "I recognize
that judges do and must legislate. But they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular
actions." 18 Judge Cardozo expresses the same view. The
courts "have the right to legislate within gaps, but often
there are no gaps. In countless litigations, the law is so
clear that the judges have no discretion." 19 Of course that
does not prevent the court from changing the law and thus
exercising its discretion legislatively, where the law is clear.
This the Supreme Court did in Farmers Loan and Trust
Co. v. Minnesota,la when it flatly reversed Blackstone v.
Miller.l9b Dean Pound, referring to the extremists who believe that the courts are legislating generally, says that "they
overlook as a rule the important difference between the process of legislative law making and the process of incidental
selection of legal materials and giving them shape as legal
precepts, which is involved in not a little of judicial decision.
The latter may be called judicial law-making without any
reflection upon the courts." 20 In another place he says,
"In Jhering's apt phrase, the process is one of jurisitic
chemistry-but the chemist does not make the chemicals
which go into his test tube." 21
However, when the Supreme Court is considering the
constitutionality of a statute under the "due process clause"
or under other vague and amorphous provisions of the Constitution, we are inclined to believe that all of the statements
8Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 523 (1916).

o CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1927)

U. S.204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930).
11b 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1902).
LAW AND MORALS, 1924, p. 54.
Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923)
at 643.

pp. 128-129.

"a280

36 HARv. L. REv. 641,
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quoted above are too conservative as they relate to the possibility of judicial law making. We would then agree with
Professor Frankfurter when he says, "With the great men
of the Supreme Court constitutional adjudication has always
been 'statecraft.' The great judges are those to whom the
Constitution is not primarily a test for interpretation but
the means of ordering the lives of a progressive people." 22
There are certain governmental powers that are so broad
and elastic as to defy and baffle any attempt at precise definition or rigid classification. This is partially due to the
nature of the powers and partially to the poverty of our
language. It would be futile to attempt to define "due
process of law" or the "police power." The method by which
our courts determine by a process of mutual inclusion and
exclusion whether a certain case falls within or without the
class may be governed partly by precedent and partly by
what has been termed "constitutional conscience" or
"hunch." 23 Obviously in this particular field, constitutional
law is bound to be a more or less uncertain and amorphous
thing. Here is a field where "the decision will depend on
a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate
major premise." 24 The great desideratum of the court in
these cases will be whether the goal of its decision is an
economically or socially valuable thing.2 5
Professor Cushman, 26 in an admirable article, has traced
the various attitudes of the Supreme Court of the United
States in construing the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here in truth, is an illustration of the
Chief Justice Hughes' dictum 27 that "The Constitution is
what the judges say it is." The early view was one of judicial non-interference: In the case of Munn v. Illinois 28 the
court declared that the due process clause afforded no proTHE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT, Yale Press (1930) pp. 75, 76.
'Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive; the Function of "the
Hunch!" in JudicialDecision (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 274-280.
Holmes, J., dissent in Southern Pacific v. Jensen, supra note 18.
- Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision; Or How Judges Think,
357 (1925).
(1922) 20 Mich. L. Rev. 737. See also Frankfurter, "Hours of Labor
and Realism in ConstitutionalLaw"; (1916) 29 HARv. L. REV. 353.
2 HUGHES, ADDRESSES (1908)
p. 139.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
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tection against unreasonable rate regulation by the legislature but that the remedy (if any) was at the polls. Later
the court went to the other extreme and entered the so-called
period of "judicial ruthlessness" 29 applying a mechanical
and legalistic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
More recently the courts have become social and economic
30
experts aided and encouraged by the Brandeis type of brief.
There is also a tendency at the present time toward the
Holmes doctrine of judicial self-denial wherein the social
and economic questions are left to the legislature.3 1 On the
other hand, there is also a tendency on the part of the court
to extend its authority not only into the realm of social and
economic questions but also into the questions of physics
and metaphysics. 31'
As Dean Pound has pointed out, the evolution of the
common law was from that of "strict law"--a law of definite
rules-to one of standards, of which the standard of behavior judicially attributed to the "reasonable man" is the
principal one. The modern interpretation of "due process
of law" as reasonable legislation-that is to say, what the
court judges to be reasonable-puts our constitutional law
on an analogous footing. 32 Because of rapidly changing
economic and social conditions, the police power of the states
is expanding at the expense of the due process conception.
This inevitable growth is "the life of the law." 33 Why
should we not face the situation realistically and concede
that the Senate should have the right and the duty to pass
on the social and economic views of nominees to the Supreme
bench.
It may be said that the above conclusion is a theoretical
justification of the Senate's right to pass on the social and
economic views of nominees to the Supreme Court based on
Ives v. Buffalo R. 1K Company, 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911).
' Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (1907).
'Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499 (1919); Block v.
Hirsch, 254 U. S. 640, 41 Sup. Ct. 13 (1920).
"a First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct.
174 (1932).
" Edwin S. Corwin, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY,
Preface v: 1 Princeton University Press (4th ed. 1930).
' Brandeis, J., dissenting in Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219, 236,
44 Sup. Ct. 302 (1923).
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the role that that court plays as a policy-determining body.
We will consider only a few of the practical difficulties of
this Senatorial function in operation.
Firstly, it has been said that the Senate of the United
States is the worst "rotten borough" institution in the
world.3 4 New York, with a population of twelve millions,
has the same representation as Nevada with less than eighty
thousand. If the Senate were based on the proportional
principle, New York would have three hundred Senators to
Nevada's two. It is obvious that the "landed interests" are
over-represented in the Senate. The backward states' doctrine of Mr. Grundy is not novel. Gouverneur Morris, in the
Constitutional Convention, declared, "The busy haunts of
men, not the remote wilderness, is the proper school for
political talents. The 'back' members are always adverse to
the best measures." 35 The system of representation encourages the formation of agricultural and other blocs which
negative majority rule.3 6 Professor Ford has pointed out
that in the field of legislation, Senate majorities often represent population minorities on important measures such as
the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the renewal of the Bank
Charter in 1831, and the Tariff Act of 1842. 37 And yet with
all of its weaknesses, it is the universal opinion of students
of government that it is far superior to the House of Representatives. If there is to be legislative participation in the
appointing power, the United States Senate is the preferable
existing participant.
But the query might be raised as to whether the Senate
being predominantly rural and Southern will not be a check
on any attempt in the future to liberalize the Supreme Court.
Has it been so in the past? It is very difficult to arrive at
an answer concerning the past and even more perplexing
to formulate a prophecy regarding the future. The following aspects of the problem deserve further study: (1) the
amount of progressive legislation that has been vetoed by
Burgess, The Election of United States Senators (1902)

Q. 650.

'1

RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 583.
S. CARPENTER, DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION, pp. 60-61, Prince-

FARRAND,

'W.

ton Univ. Press (1925).
'THE

17 POL. ScI.

RISE AND GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITICS,

p. 275.
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the President; (2) the number of progressive proposals in
Presidential messages that have been disregarded by the
Senate; (3) the liberal or conservative character of the eight
nominees rejected by the Senate. But even if there are liberals among the eight, a further inquiry must be made as
to whether they were rejected because of their liberalism
or on some other ground. A study of the Senate debates
over the Parker rejection wherein only a small percentage
of the membership participated in the discussion would
throw little light on this query.
Secondly, if the Senate is to pass on the social and economic views of the nominee, does it necessarily follow that
this practice will encourage partisanship and will result in
straight party voting alignments? Obviously, if this result
is to follow, the American appointing system would break
down because of deadlocks, unless the President should go
outside his party for the nominee. During the last fiftytwo years, the Republican party has held the Presidency
for thirty-six and the Democratic party for sixteen years.
For a confirmation of appointments requiring only a majority of the Senate, the President was of the same political
party as the Senate for forty of the fifty-two years. 38 But
we need not fear the possibility of a deadlock for the very
good reason that our two great parties do not represent any
fundamental difference in point of view. If this were as
strict a party government as our political orators would
have us believe, it would have been impossible during the
last fifty-two years for any treaty to be made, for at no time
during that period did the President have the necessary twovotes of the other
thirds of the Senate without securing
39
party in support of his measure.

Finally it is submitted that if the Senate exercises its
right in the future to pass upon the social and economic
views of nominees to the Supreme bench, it will not mean
that that august tribunal will be drawn inevitably into the
maelstrom of party politics. Certain considerations will
have a determining influence to prevent that dire calamity.
' THE AmERICAN PARTY SYSTEM, MERRIAM AND

tion, 1930, Macmillan) pp. 81, 82.
'Ibid. p. 81.

GOSNELL (Revised Edi-
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First it should be noted that strictly party appointees seem

often to lose their partisanship once they have been elevated
to the Supreme bench.3ao If there was ever a case of carefully scrutinized, hand-picked political nominees, it was in
those appointments made by the Jeffersonian Republicans
after the death of the Federalist party. The fundamental
requisite of every nominee was that he be a strict constructionist and every appointee had that requisite. But Charles
Warren 40 has shown that "in Story's case, as in so many
other instances in the history of the court, there was dem-

onstrated the utter futility of the expectations frequently
entertained by politicians that the judicial decisions of a
judge would accord with his politics at the time of appointment to the Supreme bench." Confirming this view, President Buchanan wrote on July 18, 1857,41 "No Whig President has ever appointed a Democratic judge, nor has a
Democratic President appointed a Whig; and yet the remark has been general that the Democrats appointed to this

bench have always leaned to the side of power and to such
a construction of the Constitution as would extend the
powers of the Federal Government." To this statement there
is one exception, Peter V. Daniel of the Old Dominion, ap-

pointed during the closing hours of the Van Buren administration. Daniel was the strict constructionist par excellence

and for a period of nineteen years on the Supreme bench
'a Frederic J. Stimson in his autobiography, "My UNITE STATEs," reveals an interesting sidelight concerning the appointment of Justice Holmes to
the Supreme Court. Many of Roosevelt's admirers thought that Holmes was
too theoretical but Roosevelt told Stimson that he was going to appoint Holmes
because he was "right" on the Insular Cases. The country under McKinley
had committed itself to an imperial policy in the Far East. Wisely or unwisely, we had taken the Philippines and rightly or wrongly, it would not do
to let them have jury trial or the local freedom guaranteed by our national
Bill of Rights. So Holmes was appointed and on that point Roosevelt was
not disappointed. But Holmes disappointed Roosevelt soon thereafter in the
Northern Securities case. Roosevelt had also appointed Moody to the highest bench and he (Moody) was "right" in his decision both in the Insular
cases and in the Northern Securities case. At a banquet, Roosevelt declared,
"When I appointed Moody to the bench I made a home run, but Holmes made
a one-base hit and was out at second." This incident is an interesting commentary on the attempt of a President to pack the Supreme Court of the
United States, p. 102.
4 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 420.
" Ibid. footnote p. 420, v. 1.
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he dissented consistently
in every case involving the doctrine
42
of implied powers.
Men may differ as to the reasons for this desertion from
the strict constructionist camp. Beveridge believes that they
became turncoats because of the influence of the master
mind and personality of John Marshall. 43 Perhaps the extremely strict constructionist view is by its very nature
limited to the party in opposition. This explanation seems
plausible in view of the embarrassment of Jefferson over the
purchase of Louisiana. Perhaps the true explanation is
that with the growth of the country and the development
of means of transportation and communication, a sort of
"manifest destiny" compelled the abandonment of the principle that was dear to Jefferson's heart.
But there are other influences that make for the futility
of purely political appointments to our highest bench. The
tenure for life and its attending independence and the importance and dignity of the office will tend to sublimate
the factious and petty and partisan. Finally, the fact that
the court by a self-imposed limitation refuses to give advisory opinions and refuses to appear in the role of an assailant of the law by limiting its jurisdiction to a bona fide
case wherein the rights of an individual under the law are
involved will further remove the court from partisan influences. De Tocqueville, commenting on this aspect, has said,
"It will be readily understood that by connecting the censorship of the laws with the private interests of members of
the community, and by ultimately uniting the prosecution
of the law with the prosecution of an individual, legislation
is protected from wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of party spirit."
However, the impression should not be gained from the
above discussion that the Supreme Court ever has, or will
be, entirely free from political influence. Brooks Adams
has pointed out that "from the outset the American bench,
because it deals with the most fiercely contested of political
issues, has been an instrument necessary to political success.
'

Ibid. vol. 2, pp. 79-82.
4 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF MARSHALL, 60.
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Consequently, political parties have striven to control it." 4
It has been said, and I believe truly, that the trend of Marshall's and of Taney's views in cases involving political
doctrines could not be changed by argument of counsel in
special cases. They enunciated party tenets. And so in
the rare case where Supreme Court judges were selected
to serve on the Hayes-Tilden Electoral Commission, they
voted as party men. This kind of partisanship can not be
corrected by any change in the method of selection.
But the possibility of an alignment of party against
party is not the only aspect of the politics involved in the
approval or disapproval by the Senate of Presidential nominees. A more complicated feature is the probable effect
of a Senator's vote, be he Democrat or Republican, upon
his standing with his constituents and his own political
future. In fact, the ramifications of politics are so intricate that it may be doubted whether the Senate, being a
political body, can divorce political considerations from the
question as to the social and economic outlook of the
nominee.
In this connection we desire to refer to what seems to
be the most unfortunate aspect of the Parker case. Frank
R. Kent 45 writing in the Baltimore Sun before the rejection of Parker, said, "When the debate on the Parker appointment occurs this week, there will be much oratory
about his alleged conservative or reactionary trend, about
his unfairness to labor, about his political and judicial record and about Mr. Hoover, but there will be remarkably
little about his attitude toward the Negro in politics, although that will be uppermost in the minds of every regular
Republican on the floor. That is the tender spot. That is
the thing they walk around as if it were a swamp. It is
hypocrisy at its height." This acute observer of the American political scene was right. Such regular Republicans
as Deneen of Illinois and Robinson of Indiana voted
against the Parker nomination presumably because of their
"THE

THEORY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS,

BALTIMORE SUN for

April 28, 1930.

pp. 47-48.
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fear of the Negro vote, and ten Southern Democrats

for Parker. Their position was a difficult one.

46

voted

If Parker

was to be rejected because of his view on the Negro in poli-

tics, perhaps no outstanding Southern nominee of either
party can be found in the future whose view will differ
from that of Parker.

Even if it were possible to find a

capable nominee who had not expressed himself publicly
on the matter, the Senate as a real advisory body would
find a means of "smoking out" the nominee. The significance of this aspect of the case can only be realized when
it is pointed out that Justice McReynolds is the only Southerner on the present bench and that he is entitled to, and

it is rumored will, retire in 1932. There was a time 4 7 when
the slave power dominated the Supreme Court of the United
States. Has it come to pass that the New South will be
unrepresented on the highest tribunal because of the political power of the emancipated Negro? 48
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"Blease, Broussard, Glass, Harrison, Overman, Ransdell, Stephens, Swanson, Simmons, and Smith paired in favor.
" Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1856).
" The vote on the Parker nomination was as follows: Yeas, 39. Allen,
Baird, Bingham, Blease, Broussard, Dale, Fess, Gillett, Glass, Goldsborough,
Gould, Greene, Hale, Harrison, Hastings, Hatfield, Hebert, Jones, Kean,
Keyes, McCulloch, Metcalf, Oddie, Overman, Patterson, Ransdell, Reed,
Shortridge, Simmons, Smoot, Steck, Stephens, Sullivan, Swanson, Thomas
(Ida), Townsend, Walcott, Waterman, Watson.
Nays, 41. Ashurst, Barkley, Black, Blaine, Borah, Bratton, Brock,
Capper, Caraway, Connally, Copeland, Couzens, Cutting, Deneen, Dill, Fratier,
Harris, Hawes, Hayden, Howell, Johnson, Kendrick, La Follette, McKellar,
Norris, Nye, Pine, Pittnan, Robinson (Ark.), Robinson (Ind.), Schall,
Sheppard, Shipstead, Steiwer, Trammell, Tydings, Vandenburg, Wagner,
Walsh (Mass.), Walsh (Mont.), Wheeler.
Not Voting, 16. Brookhart, Fletcher, George, Glenn, Goff, Grundy, Heflin,
King, McMaster, McNary, Moses, Norbeck, Phipps, Robison, Smith, Thomas
(Okla.).

